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Abstract
Current norms among professional military officers that govern obedience and dissent
strongly discourage officers from offering public criticism of policy enacted by civilian
authorities, even if that policy is immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional. We identify a set of
circumstances that create a moral imperative for an officer to take action and we lever-
age prevailing ethical guidelines to argue that in certain cases, even individual officers not
directly involved in the execution of the policy have moral standing to offer public criticism
of it. We consider the consequences of relaxing norms prohibiting public dissent and explore
the trade-off between tolerating immoral policy and the likelihood of mistakenly criticiz-
ing appropriate policy. Finally, we offer evidence that current military-civilian relations in
the United States are such that placing higher value on dissent would benefit professional
military officers and may improve policy.
Keywords Dissent · Military ethics · Collective responsibility · Civilian-military relations
1 Government Policy andMilitary Ethics
Military-civilian relations are a critical component of any free and open society. Civilian
control of the military is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution specifically to reduce the likeli-
hood of a military coup, or even to reduce the likelihood that military leaders will become
too involved in politics. This institutional arrangement helps to cultivate norms within the
American military that reward obedience and discourage dissent that are essential to the
success of any professional military organization. However, in this paper we argue that gen-
tly relaxing norms that suppress certain kinds of dissent would benefit professional military
officers and would likely help improve government policy.
The notion of moral standing is critical to our justification to violate the norm against
dissent. Not only is it generally inappropriate for an officer to criticize the policy his seniors
implement, he has a moral and legal duty to obey (Department of Defense 2006). However,
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in the event the officer is given an illegal or immoral order, then his duty to obey clashes
with his duty to uphold the Constitution. Were he to obey the order, he would be complicit
in carrying out an immoral order and this action would jeopardize his honor. The fact that
the order threatens his honor gives him moral standing to criticize it. Essentially, members
of the profession excuse the officer for publicly criticizing the order because he has the
moral standing to do so.
We examine the situation in which a military officer perceives a particular government
policy to be immoral. The means by which the individual arrives at this determination is
outside the scope of this essay. We do animate this part of the discussion by reference to
the individual’s belief in the Constitution and the individual’s oath to support and defend
it as one plausible mechanism, but it could be any crisis of conscience on the part of the
individual. Next, we apply an existing and commonly held set of guidelines designed to help
officers who find themselves on the horns of a moral dilemma. We ultimately find that an
officer in such a position is duty-bound to take action and one form of acceptable action is
to offer public dissent. The officer has moral standing to offer public dissent, because their
honor would be threatened if they remain silent. Finally, we address some of the objections
that others might offer as to the consequences of relaxing the norm against public dissent.
This article contributes to two streams of literature. First, we extend the professional
military ethics literature to cover guidelines for individuals to consider when immoral gov-
ernment policy places them under the burden of a moral imperative to act. This provides
valuable information to military members as they endeavor to serve in an ethical manner
and is eminently relevant to civilians as well, to the extent civilians benefit from a pro-
fessional military that follows the Constitution and acquits itself in a manner consistent
with national ideals. Second, we examine the ramifications with respect to military-civilian
relations that relaxing the norm against public dissent might create. We argue that while tol-
erating or encouraging more public dissent from the officer corps challenges certain views
of the virtues of a non-political officer corps, we argue a more appropriate aim for the offi-
cer corps to pursue is to achieve and maintain a strictly non-partisan status while remaining
cognizant of political processes and machinations.
This essay focuses on the American experience for a number of reasons. First, the U.S.
military is a large organization with many members to whom the arguments in this essay
applies. Second, the U.S. Government has been very active in recent history by engaging in
a number of controversial policies which are useful to animate our discussion, particularly in
Sections 4 and 5. That said, the argument should generalize to most any liberal democratic
society in which civilian authorities control the military and a substantial portion of the
officer corps serve voluntarily.
2 Background andMotivation
A recent contribution to the literature on professional military ethics demonstrates that
career military officers can be held morally blameworthy for unethical policies carried
out by other government agents (Seagren 2015). Seagren outlines a set of four sufficient
conditions which, if satisfied, place a career military officer under the burden of a moral
imperative to act in order to resolve the moral dilemma created by immoral government
policy. Numerous scholars have addressed issues of collective responsibility with respect
to war (Crawford 2007; French 1973; Lewis 1948), as well as corporations (French 1984),
ethnic groups (May 1987), and nations (Stilz 2011; Abdel-Nour 2003; Davion 2006). The
argument Seagren presents applies Narveson’s unique framework, a view consistent with
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methodological individualism and one that does not rely on notions of irreducible respon-
sibility (Narveson 2002). In short, Narveson argues that for collective responsibility to
transmit to the individual member of the group, a necessary condition is that the indi-
vidual must be a voluntary member of that organization and be free to exit (Narveson
2002, pg. 192).
We may continue if the reader acknowledges the validity of the argument (Seagren 2015)
presents, or at least can imagine an alternative mechanism through which collective respon-
sibility might render a military officer blameworthy. An example is Kutz (2000), who argues
that an individual’s intentional participation, broadly conceived, in certain collective activi-
ties that cause harm can be sufficient to render those individuals morally responsible. Other
alternatives may exist, but to be clear we are most concerned with moral questions regard-
ing collective responsibility rather than whether an individual is, say, legally complicit in
some act that a group commits. The question turns to what ought the officer do when they
find they are morally blameworthy as a result of such collective responsibility and what
steps can she take to discharge her moral duties in this situation? This essay is our attempt
to answer this question.
2.1 Dissent and Civilian-Military Relations
To encourage public dissent in certain cases surely affects civilian-military relations. Any
discussion of the military-civilian nexus in the United States Government begins with Hunt-
ington’s seminal work (Huntington 1957). In it, Huntington argues that the military is a
profession whose members are experts in the management of violence on behalf of the State
and the core virtue of a professional military is obedience to the State (Huntington 1957, pg.
74). He argues that the best way to succeed in this endeavor is for the civilian leadership
to achieve objective control of the military, which is marked by a professionalized military
that is both highly competent and “politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington 1957, pg.
84). In such an arrangement, the officer corps concentrates entirely on military matters and
leaves matters of politics and policy to the civilian leadership. In Huntington’s view, a soci-
ety that achieves objective control maximizes the functional imperative of security from
foreign aggression while safeguarding the societal imperative to maintain a liberal society
(Feaver 1996).
A number of scholars challenge aspects of Huntington’s theory and point out the diffi-
culty associated with actually separating political matters from military matters in practice
(Burk 2002; Brooks 2009). After all, Clauswitz famously reminds us “War is... a continua-
tion of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, pg. 87). At the
highest levels of military leadership, to draw a clear line between the two is an impossible
task. Is the decision to invade a country with 150,000 troops versus 400,000 troops a polit-
ical decision, or a military one?1 In fact, Janowitz (1961) embraces the political nature of
participation in the officer corps and Brooks (2009) notes that while some political activity
can cause harm, some activity may improve outcomes. “[P]olitical activity by military lead-
ers can at times benefit U.S. national security by generating better-informed and considered
military strategy, plans, and defense policy” (Brooks 2009, pg.215). When officers fail to
1See Moten (2009) for a thorough discussion of the dispute between General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of
Staff, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 over the appropriate number of troops with which
to invade Iraq.
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offer advice or to weigh in on policy issues, they may miss an opportunity to shape policy
that would advance either the functional or societal imperatives.
Feaver (2003) provides an alternative theory of civilian-military relations that explains
various aspects of that relationship throughout the Cold War. The theoretical basis of
Feaver’s work is the Principal-Agent Model. The Principal-Agent Model is one that, among
other aspects, leverages the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent to
explain various employer and employee relationships (Sappington 1991). In Feaver’s formu-
lation, the civilian authority (i.e. executive branch leadership) is the principal and therefore
sets the policy and hires the military as an agent to provide security services. But monitoring
employees is costly, so the principal may not notice if the military decides to shirk. Other
scholars include a supervisor to monitor the work of the agent on behalf of the principal.
In many ways this complicates the information asymmetries (Tirole 1986; Strausz 1997).
Feaver correctly notes that the ultimate principal is really the citizenry and that the members
of the civilian leadership are themselves the citizens’ agents. Similarly, The Armed Forces
Officer, a book intended to “define the common ethical core of all officers” clearly agrees
with this sentiment (Department of Defense 2006, pg ii). It states “the [Officer’s Oath of
Office] unmistakably underscored ‘We the People’ as the highest authority in the military
chain of command” (pg 2). We argue that military officers who voice their dissent pub-
licly, under certain conditions, help to correct the information deficiency of the principal
(citizenry) in this relationship.
Numerous scholars working in the fields of business and accounting ethics note the
importance of voicing dissent. Shahinpoor and Matt note the importance for organiza-
tions to recognize and protect what they call “principled dissent” (Shahinpoor and Matt
2007, pg.38). Reed draws from the literature on followership to develop several principles
of ethical dissent, to include “to the goals of the organization be true” and “exercise voice
and exit as a last resort” (Reed 2014, pp. 11-12). A number of others focus primarily on the
role of whistleblowing (Elliston 1982; Jubb 1999; Chiu 2003; Jensen 1987; Weber 1993).
While the individual circumstances of some whistleblowers may satisfy the conditions we
focus on in this paper, our scope is wider than an ethics of whistleblowing. One important
difference is that we stipulate the evidence of the immoral policy is already publicly known.
However, there are parallels in that the moral position of whistleblowers often gives them
the moral credibility necessary to speak out and shields them from censure for behavior that
would, under other circumstances, qualify as a transgression. For example, it is usually con-
sidered immoral to violate a non-disclosure agreement because in most circumstances one
should keep their promises, but that is often forgiven if the breach is to reveal evidence of
illegal activity.
Several active and retired military officers have recently argued in favor of more vig-
orous dissent (Snider 2008; Gibson 2012; Angeles 2013). Milburn argues forcefully that
professional military officers should push back against pernicious or ill-conceived policy,
especially when other branches of government are unwilling to do so (Milburn 2010). He
states:
The military professional plays a key role as a check and balance at the indistinct junc-
ture between policy and military strategy. He should not try to exclude himself from
this role, even on issues that appear to involve policy, any more than the statesman
should exclude himself from overseeing the conduct of military operations. He has a
moral obligation to dissent rooted in his oath of office and his code of professional
ethics (Milburn 2010, pg. 105).
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Admittedly, Milburn confines his argument to criticism of poor or ineffective policy. How-
ever, if dissent is justifiable in response to poor policy from a practical perspective, it
certainly seems justifiable in response to unconstitutional or immoral policy.
Marine Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold retired months before the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. In 2006 he wrote a scathing article in Time magazine criticizing the Bush adminis-
tration for the way in which they went to war in Iraq (Newbold 2006). While his actions
have certainly fueled discussions concerning appropriate conduct for professional military
officers in retirement (Cook 2008), his essay is relevant to our discussion because in it, he
expresses remorse in that he should have offered stronger dissent while still on active duty.
With the encouragement of some still in positions of military leadership, I offer a
challenge to those still in uniform: a leader’s responsibility is to give voice to those
who can’t–or don’t have the opportunity to–speak. Enlisted members of the armed
forces swear their oath to those appointed over them; an officer swears an oath not to
a person but to the Constitution. The distinction is important (Newbold 2006).
Both Milburn and Newbold stress the nature of enlisted member’s oaths may leave them
open to exploitation, and thus it is the officer corps’ responsibility to safeguard this sacred
trust. To offer loyal dissent, when necessary, is an important part of this responsibility. In
Section 5 we examine what can happen when the officer corps fails to uphold this trust.
2.2 Focus onMatters of Policy that are Illegal or Immoral
It is necessary to limit the scope of our discussion to focus on government policies of a
particular quality. Consider the matrix in Fig. 1. Along the vertical axis, we draw the levels
of war, from strategic to tactical.2 The reader may also think of this axis as the reach of
the policy considered (perhaps as measured in number of people affected), or similarly, the
relative position of the decision-making unit responsible for the policy with the President as
Commander in Chief at the top of that axis.
Along the horizontal axis, we draw the spectrum that addresses the nature of the objection
or criticism of the policy. To the left are those issues with which a military officer might have
practical objection, or in other words, the objection stems from their military judgment. To
the right are those issues that are morally or legally objectionable. There is certainly no clear
line between when an officer’s critique of a policy moves from a purely military or practical
matter and into a moral one. The officer’s expertise is in the management of violence, and
as such one may find that these matters arguably contain a moral component (Huntington
1957, pg. 12).
We focus our discussion on policies that create moral issues for officers that fall into
Quadrant I, but it is helpful to consider issues that might end up in the other quadrants for
comparison. One might place a high-ranking general’s disagreement with the procurement
of a major weapon system in II, while a junior officer’s frustration over a seemingly bureau-
cratic and inefficient aspect of the logistics system in III. A platoon commander, or some
other small unit leader, who finds evidence that another platoon commander covered up an
illegal killing would likely fall into Quadrant IV.
Controversial policies implemented at the highest levels of government in connection
with the War on Terror include, but are not limited to torture (Mazzetti 2014; Pfiffner 2005;
Reinke 2006; Alkadry and Witt 2009), indefinite detention (Lewis 2003; Koven 2009),
2See Joint Staff (Joint Staff 2001) for doctrinal definitions of these terms.
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Fig. 1 Policy characterization spectrum
warrantless surveillance (Risen and Lichtblau 2005), targeted killing of American citizens
(Becker and Shane 2012; Savage and Baker 2013), and prosecuting wars without congres-
sional approval (Savage 2011; Epps 2015). We place each of these policies in Quadrant I.
The qualities that these policies share that make them particularly relevant to the present
discussion are the fact that they were decided upon at the highest levels of government; they
are related to the application of violence and coercion; and they are, arguably, candidates
for significant or large-scale miscarriages of justice. For our argument to succeed it is not
necessary to convince the reader of the inappropriateness of any of these policies. Our point
in bringing them up is to enable the reader to imagine the sorts of policies, in the abstract,
that might be worthy of a public response from a career military officer. Furthermore, it is
important to acknowledge that while readers may differ in their moral assessments of these
policies, so too may individual officers.
Our focus on the first quadrant ensures that the effect of the policy in question is
widespread, while also ensuring a political quality to such policies. More important, we limit
ourselves to moral objections from the point of view of the individual officer rather than
practical ones. A moral objection provides a stronger justification to override the officer’s
conflicting duty of obedience to senior members of the chain of command. It is possible that
public dissent can be justified if an officer’s objection were merely practical, but we leave a
fully developed discussion of that possibility for future work.
It is important to flesh out the nature of the dilemma we envision that our subjects face
in this paper. Coleman (2009) differentiates between ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity.
An ethical dilemma is one in which the challenge lies in choosing the right course of action,
usually because such dilemmas cause individuals to choose between competing loyalties.
In contrast, a test of integrity is one in which the right course of action is known, but it is
costly or unpleasant to execute (Coleman 2009, p. 106). When an officer acknowledges that
a particular policy or order is immoral or illegal, deciding whether to offer public dissent
tends to pit their allegiance to the Constitution against their loyalty to, or duty to obey, their
chain of command. We consider that an ethical dilemma, especially because the norm that
demands obedience in most matters is currently so strong.
Finally, the other margin along which we limit the scope of our discussion is the target
population. We only consider career military officers. We neglect enlisted members due to
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complexities in their moral relationships with the chain of command, and we neglect first-
term officers in order to avoid any complications involving ignorance of military life.3 The
employment relationship that career military officers share with the government is over-
whelmingly voluntary, a critical feature we exploit below. While readers may notice that the
argument presented may be readily extended to include certain groups, such as federal civil
servants, we leave those considerations for future work.
3 The Direct Case and the Constitutional Paradigm
If a career military officer ever perceives a moral dilemma in which their duty to obey
the orders of a senior officer conflicts with their moral compass, particularly with respect
to their understanding of the Constitution, they must either resign their commission or
refuse the order and face any potential adverse consequences. We refer to this as the direct
case. The most developed framework in the scholarly literature is Roush’s Constitutional
Paradigm of Military Ethics (CPME), which is commonly taught in some form to service
academy students and officer candidates Roush (2008). We examine the CPME closely
here to provide a point of departure for our analysis of the collective case in the following
section. Alternative sources of professional norms and ethical standards do exist (Depart-
ment of Defense 2006). These sources help the officer identify ethical dilemmas, but few
provide an explicit guide for how to resolve an ethical dilemma.
The paradigm consists of four principles that must be employed sequentially:
– (P1) Acknowledge that the Constitution is at the top of the loyalty hierarchy (i.e.
Constitution, Mission, Service, Ship/Command, Shipmate, Self).
– (P2) Take action to resolve any conflicting loyalties.
– (P3.1) Resign if unwilling or unable to resolve conflicting loyalties. -or-
– (P3.2) If sufficiently justified, disobey the order.
Roush suggests that before an officer elects to directly disobey an order (principle P3.2),
the situation should satisfy the following prerequisites:
– (P3.2a) The dilemma should involve a non-trivial violation of justice.
– (P3.2b) The individual must first try to get the order changed.
– (P3.2c) The individual must disobey the order in a public manner.
– (P3.2d) The individual must accept any consequences (Roush 2008, pg. 80).
The CPME is an appropriate map for the individual who is directly involved in a moral
dilemma, such as when an officer receives what he perceives to be an illegal order. It pro-
vides the individual with steps to take to ensure that his subsequent actions continue to
support and defend the Constitution. Perhaps most important, it guides the individual to
provide valuable feedback to the institution in two important ways. First and foremost, the
individual communicates clearly and forcefully to the chain of command his opinion with
regard to the perceived illegal or immoral order. To refuse to carry out an order or to tender
one’s resignation provides immediate and unmistakable feedback to the officer giving the
controversial order.
Second, whether an individual decides to resign or decides to disobey the order he per-
ceives as immoral, he imposes a cost on their organization. This cost includes the manpower
3For elaboration on this point, see Seagren (2015, pg. 183-185).
48 C.W. Seagren
cost of replacing a highly trained professional officer – or court martialing him and bearing
the cost in public relations.
The notion of moral standing plays a critical role in granting legitimacy to the junior
officer’s feedback to the institution in this situation. Of course, obedience to orders is an
essential virtue that each member of a professional officer corps must exemplify. Normally,
a set of strict laws and norms limit a subordinate’s ability to provide feedback to his seniors
on the orders he is expected to carry out. For example, good commanders may invite discus-
sion among the staff regarding courses of action before the decision is made and as such, the
sorts of disagreements that might take place behind closed doors are often encouraged. In
contrast, to offer criticism in public, after the decision has been made, would be a dramatic
display of insubordination and possibly punishable under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Going outside the accepted norms without appropriate standing is subject to both
formal and informal punishment (Kiel 2007).
The CPME requires the individual to perform P3.2 publicly. The primary purpose for
this is to ensure the officer giving the order knows the junior officer intends to refuse the
order, rather than privately shirk or deceptively avoid executing the order. The presence of
this principle is critical evidence of the role that feedback is intended to play and it closely
parallels principals of civil disobedience and the notion that one has a moral duty to disobey
unjust laws and willfully accept the negative consequences of that action (King 1963).
A final aspect that is important for our subsequent discussion is that once a military mem-
ber completes steps P1 and P2, the existence of the moral imperative is confirmed. Thus,
“do nothing” is not an option according to the CPME. The individual bears the burden of
the moral imperative until they resolve their situation, either through resignation or refusal.
4 The Collective Case Creates a Moral Imperative to Act
The previous section explores the options an individual has when faced with a moral imper-
ative as a result of direct involvement with an apparently unlawful order. However, this is
not the only way in which a military officer may be burdened with a moral imperative. Cir-
cumstances may plausibly exist that place career military officers under the burden of a
moral imperative due to policy of one’s service or other government agencies, by virtue of a
mechanism of collective responsibility (Seagren 2015). These cases are particularly impor-
tant in light of the fact that government agencies outside the Department of Defense have
carried out some of the more controversial policies.
Let us consider the case of a career naval officer, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Jones.4
Suppose LCDR Jones has identified a particular policy implemented by the government that
she feels resides in Quadrant I of Fig. 1 (Section 2.2). We now examine four sufficiency
conditions that if satisfied, would render Jones morally blameworthy through collective
responsibility: (S1) Jones’ group constitutes a purposive organization comprised of mem-
bers who are easily distinguished from non-members; (S2) Jones’ relationship with the
organization is voluntary; (S3) certain aspects of the official policy or mission of the orga-
nization are patently immoral; and (S4) Jones is aware of the immoral policy. We examine
each more carefully below.
4A Lieutenant Commander typically has between ten to twenty years of commissioned service, and are
effectively mid-level officers. The rank is equivalent to that of of Major in the Marine Corps, Army, and Air
Force.
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(S1) The United States Government and the Executive Branch, including the Department
of Defense, easily qualifies as purposive organizations. While a career officer may
find herself as a member of numerous morally relevant groups within the government
(i.e. company, battalion, ship, service, etc), it is important to note that two aspects
serve to tie seemingly distant government employees together. The first is that the
President of the United States appears at the top of every executive branch employee’s
chain of command or organizational structure. The second is that every executive
branch employee swears an oath of office to support and defend the Constitution,
which is an unambiguous and emphatic demonstration of shared goals throughout
the organization.
(S2) As a career officer, i.e. one who serves past his or her initial contract, Jones’ employ-
ment relationship with the Navy is overwhelmingly voluntary. Aside from a very
narrow category of cases in which she might face legal sanction if she tried to resign
(e.g. in the face of the enemy) all Jones must do to sever her employment relation-
ship is to ask, and her request will be granted within a relatively short period of
time. Of course if her resignation request is denied, her employment relationship is
no longer voluntary, sufficiency condition S2 no longer holds, and we may no longer
hold Jones morally blameworthy.
(S3) The key aspect to consider for this condition is whether the policy in question is
produced by the official decision making apparatus within the organization. Given
the nature of the agencies and departments involved in national security, this is often
a straight-forward proposition.
(S4) In the present case, Jones is aware of the policies either through direct knowledge,
admissions of government officials, or credible press reports.
Thus, to the extent that government agents are known to carry out immoral policy, Jones’
voluntary relationship with an organization that pursues such ends renders her morally
blameworthy. To be sure, she shares this blame with numerous others, some of whom, such
as the more direct perpetrators, are even more blameworthy. But, the fact that she is only
indirectly involved in the wrong-doing does not absolve her of the responsibility to act. In
other words, if an officer is aware of a government policy that he or she would personally
be unable to carry out for moral reasons if directly involved, then to simply maintain the
status quo erodes that individual’s honor. We turn next to the question of what Jones, and
others who find themselves in this situation, can do about it.
4.1 Only Public Dissent Achieves Effective Feedback Under CPME
Suppose the press credibly reveals that federal department X is engaged in a policy Y that
would reasonably be assigned to Quadrant I of Fig. 1. LCDR Jones, a career military officer,
is troubled by this fact. In fact, she recognizes that if she were assigned to department X
and ordered to participate in policy Y, she would either resign or refuse the order, as per the
CPME. We now ask what guidance the CPME provides to Jones so that she may resolve the
dilemma under these collective circumstances.
It is clear that we apply P1 in the exact same fashion as if Jones were personally and
directly confronted with the immoral act. In this case, she confirms that the Constitution
is at the top of her hierarchy and validates that policy Y indeed violates the Constitution.
Next, we find that P2 is likely trivial to employ because department X may not even appear
on Jones’s list of loyalties, which renders resolution of the conflict by means of rearranging
the hierarchy of loyalties impossible. If department X does appear on the list, as it might if
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department X is the Department of Defense, we simply must confirm that it resides under
the Constitution, just as we do in the direct case. Finally, Jones is left with a choice between
resign (P3.1) or disobey (P3.2).
4.1.1 Resignation Resolves the Moral Imperative
Resignation severs Jones’ voluntary relationship with the government and resolves the
moral imperative from her perspective. Even if the Navy delays her resignation for oper-
ational or administrative purposes, her act of requesting resignation clearly indicates her
eagerness to end the employment relationship. From that moment on, she is no longer a
voluntary member of the organization.
That said, resignation under these circumstances is eminently dissatisfying for at least
two reasons: First, doing so is unlikely to provide the offending institution with effective
feedback. Resigning one’s commission does not usually communicate any disapprobation
to anyone outside a very narrow segment of the officer’s service. Service secretaries do not
regularly read the resignation letters of their officers, though it is conceivable that some
may make it to the secretary’s desk. This means the government agents responsible for the
offending policy are highly unlikely to even learn of officer’s resignation, let alone learn
of the nature of her motivation for resigning. This is in stark contrast to the direct case we
discuss in Section 3, wherein the officer’s act of resigning immediately and unequivocally
informs the officials responsible for giving the offending order that an officer down the
chain of command finds the order immoral.
Similarly, a Navy officer who resigns her commission may not impose any costs on
the offending agency. In our scenario, if “department X” is say, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the fact that the Navy must expend additional resources to induct and train
a replacement for LCDR Jones is highly unlikely to adversely impact the CIA. We might
imagine a scenario in which dozens, or perhaps even hundreds, of military officers resign
in protest of a CIA policy. But even in that case, the cost would have to be large enough
to animate the Secretary of Defense to expend his or her political capital to lobby the CIA
Director (or the President) to change the offending policy.
Perhaps most important, if all the officers that find a particularly policy immoral or
unconstitutional resign, it leaves the officer corps staffed with those who tolerate abhorrent
behavior. This phenomenon is similar to the mechanism by which economist F.A. Hayek
explains “why the worst get on top” in certain organizations (Hayek 1944, pp. 148-167).
Indeed, we argue that fealty to the Constitution implies a duty not to resign. While Hayek
more specifically references totalitarian regimes, his discussion is easily applied to bureau-
cracies in general. He states “[T]here will be need for actions which are bad in themselves,
and while all those still influenced by traditional morals will be reluctant to perform, the
readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power” (pg 146).
Note this concern is unique to the collective case. Suppose we have a direct case in which
a senior officer gives a patently illegal order to, say, summarily execute a prisoner of war. As
we discuss in Section 3, the officer may rightfully resign under such circumstances. We tend
not to lament the fact that if the junior officer resigned in that situation it would leave the
officer corps populated only with officers willing to execute prisoners because the beneficial
feedback the resignation provides to the institution more than outweighs the negative effect
of an honorable officer leaving the officer corps. In contrast, resignation in the collective
case fails to provide effective feedback which makes the primary effect a more obvious net
negative for the institution and the profession.
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4.1.2 Maintaining Status QuoMaintains the Moral Imperative
We now examine the feasibility of step P3.2, disobey the order. The main practical problem
with P3.2 as a course of action is that since Jones is not directly involved in the execution
of the illegal or immoral policy, there is no order for her to disobey. Thus, we proceed in
two different ways. In this section we briefly consider an extremely literal interpretation of
P4 under the circumstances. In the next section, we examine clues from the CPME in an
attempt to find a course of action that both resolves the moral imperative and is consistent
with the spirit of the CPME.
Suppose LCDR Jones explores option P3.2 and proceeds to attempt to disobey the order.
Of course, she is not in receipt of the order so there is nothing for her to disobey. The result
is no change in the status quo. Perhaps she tells herself that if she were given an order to
support the policy in question she would immediately and gladly disobey and accept the
consequences. Perhaps she even redoubles her alertness to whether her actions contribute
to the policy in question. However, these activities do not change the fact that she remains
a voluntary member of an organization (the government) that pursues immoral ends (policy
Y). Thus, the conditions that bring about the moral imperative are still firmly in place. If
Jones wishes to avoid resigning her commission, she still must do something.
4.1.3 Public Dissent is Consistent with CPME Guidelines
We note at the end of Section 3 above that following the CPME enables the individual to
successfully resolve the (direct case) ethical dilemma as well as to provide invaluable feed-
back to the institution, both in the form of information and costs. In this section, we argue
that public dissent is a reasonable and justifiable course of action for Lieutenant Commander
Jones and her unique circumstances. We do not discount the possibility that other courses
of action may exist that may even be better along various margins. We simply argue that
public dissent advances the individual towards resolving the moral imperative under which
he or she finds themselves and it provides critical feedback to the institution.
The key to resolving whether it is possible to fulfill the duties outlined in the CPMEwhile
remaining in the military is found in the prerequisites to P3.2. Recall, P3.2a requires that the
dilemma involves a non-trivial miscarriage of justice. While this is certainly a crucial step
from the individual’s perspective, the scope of our paper ensures we meet this requirement
for this case. Prerequisite P3.2b requires that the officer attempt to get the order changed,
while prerequisite P3.2c requires that any refusal to act must be performed in public. The
source of the immoral policy is not an individual in Jones’ immediate chain of command, so
the public route might be the most direct route to the individuals responsible. We argue that
if Jones elects not to resign in this situation, her duty to comply with the CPME compels
her to make a public declaration and try to get the policy changed.
A stringent norm exists that generally prohibits military members from publicly criticiz-
ing policy and policy makers. Consider the “classic” example of the sort of moral dilemma
the CPME was specifically designed to handle, that in which a senior officer gives a junior
officer an illegal or immoral order. Her duty to obey her chain of command collides with
her duty uphold the Constitution. It would not normally be appropriate for the junior to pub-
licly comment on the orders she is expected to execute, but the moral dilemma gives her
standing to breach that norm and publicly refuse the order. In other words, the chain of com-
mand and the specific actions of the senior officer threaten to besmirch the junior’s honor,
which provides justification for the junior to come forward in public. As we discuss above,
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Jones’s honor is similarly threatened by department X’s behavior with respect to Policy Y.
Thus, Jones has moral standing to publicly criticize department X and attempt to persuade
department X to change its policy. Officers are reminded that they “[P]rotect their status as
members of an honored profession by refusing to tolerate practices by fellow members that
violate the public trust of norms of the profession” (Department of Defense 2006, pg 26).
Such a public declaration catalogs Jones’s moral disapproval of policy Y and provides
evidence for an outside observer to reject the hypothesis that her continued employment
signifies Jones’s tolerance of, or support for, policy Y. In addition it provides feedback to the
individuals involved in the execution of the policy and, perhaps more important, provides
information to the general public. A number of researchers conclude that individuals who
openly resist or dissent from an immoral collective action are, or should be, relieved of
any part of the collective responsibility resulting from the action (Feinberg 1968; McGary
1986). Second, in addition to raising the public’s attention on the matter, an effective public
declaration communicates Jones’s disapproval of the policy to the appropriate people. This
raises awareness of the policy to those in department X who can take action, or anyone in
the government hierarchy above them with sufficient authority to correct the situation.
4.2 An Inclusive Definition of “Public”
Any moral judgment an individual might make remains private until they disclose it some-
one else. At one end of this spectrum, an individual might simply share an opinion with a
stranger on a bus. Towards the other end, an individual might publish an op-ed in a major
national newspaper. The latter stakes out a stance in a clearly public manner, while the for-
mer is not sufficiently public for our purposes. So, we must think more carefully about
where we might draw the line.
The notion of the dispassionate observer is helpful here. Adam Smith often referred to
the role the impartial spectator plays in helping to shape our moral judgment (Smith 1976),
while more recent scholars like Firth (1952) employ relatively similar devices. We propose
that if a reasonable, impartial spectator drawn from the ranks of the general public would
conclude that LCDR Jones is morally opposed the the policy in question, then she has
successfully committed an act of public dissent.
Notice that there are two conditions implicit in that statement above. First, the act of dis-
sent must be clear enough for the impartial spectator to apprehend the officer’s position.
Most important, the act of dissent must be available or accessible to an impartial spec-
tator drawn from the general population. Of course not every American reads the major
newspapers regularly or has subscriptions to the armed services’ professional magazines,
but publishing through such channels does make them readily accessible. What’s more is
that the fact a third party publishes the material provides a level of scrutiny to the officer’s
argument.
Publishing an opinion piece in a national or regional newspaper is an attractive option,
given the visibility of such an action to a wide variety of stakeholders, as well as its relatively
moderate degree of difficulty for the officer in question. As is publication of an article in
a scholarly or professional outlet. Among the most ambitious options is to sue the relevant
agent or agency in federal court. In 2016, Nathan Smith, a captain in the U.S. Army, filed
suit against President Obama in an effort to get the court to rule on the legality of Operation
Inherent Resolve (Epps 2015; Chokshi 2016; Savage 2016). The suit was unsuccessful from
a legal standpoint, but it would have succeeded in convincing a impartial spectator where
Captain Smith stood on this important issue.
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5 Objections and Replies
In the sections above, we argue the case that public dissent is a viable and appropriate course
of action from the perspective of the individual officer. It provides the government and the
American people with substantive feedback that may positively affect policy and help cor-
rect injustices. For the individual officer, such a public declaration provides a dispassionate
observer with evidence that the individual’s continued voluntary association with the gov-
ernment should not be taken to mean they are tolerant or supportive of the policy. We now
turn to a discussion of possible objections.
5.1 The Floodgates Would Open
Perhaps the primary objection to our proposal is that it would “open the floodgates” of inso-
lent officers spouting off publicly on matters of policy that are outside of their areas of exper-
tise or above their paygrades. Such an outcome could seriously erode good order and discip-
line, and would certainly be cause for concern. But any anticipated reduction in obedience
must be weighed against the benefits of effective criticism of immoral or illegal policy.
Figure 2 outlines an error matrix that applies to the problem at hand. Consider that a
given policy is either morally acceptable or not. For any given policy an officer may either
support it or not on the basis of her moral reckoning. Supporting a morally appropriate pol-
icy is consistent with professional obedience (upper-left cell). The loyal dissent we justify
in Section 4 above is located in the lower-right quadrant of the matrix.
We readily admit that an acute error that may adversely affect good order and discipline
occurs when an officer mistakenly criticizes a morally or legally appropriate policy (upper
right quadrant of Fig. 2). The case of Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Lakin is a recent
example. Lakin was an Army doctor who refused an order to deploy to Afghanistan in
2010 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom because he disputed President Obama’s
qualifications for the office. He announced that he would refuse to deploy until such time as
the president would release his birth certificate and prove his citizenship. Lakin was found
guilty at court-martial of missing unit movement and was sentenced to six months in prison
and discharged from the Army (Shane 2010).
Fig. 2 Error matrix for collective case
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Fig. 3 A graphical depiction of the tradeoff
We can imagine a spectrum of obedience for the officer corps that looks like Fig. 3.
At one end of the spectrum is an eminently obedient officer corps that never engages in
insubordination, and never engages in dissent or criticism of any sort. In such a case we
might expect a non-trivial number of cases where the officers’ errors of omission aid and
abed immoral policy. At the other end of the spectrum is a disobedient and unprofessional
officer corps which tends to commit many errors of insubordination. As we move from left
to right, the magnitude of the costs that result from speaking out inappropriately gradually
increase, however, the costs that result from failure to criticize inappropriate policy decrease.
The minimum of the sum of these costs is somewhere in the middle.
We argue that, at present, the current state of the officer corps in the United States is too
close to the complete obedience end of the spectrum (see the vertical grey line in Fig. 3) and
that a move to the right would be beneficial. We highlight two substantial examples from
the past fifteen years to animate our discussion: the U.S. Government’s policy with respect
to torture and the legal justification for Operation Odyssey Dawn. We select these examples
because they are particularly egregious in their own ways and as such, it at least plausible
that had military officers voiced strong opinions against them, they could have positively
influenced the policy discussion. Yet, as we show, few if any professional officers stepped
forward to voice opposition or offer alternatives.
5.1.1 Recent Experience Regarding the Torture Program
In August of 2002, memoranda that outline the legal opinion of lawyers at the Department
of Justice on the topic of interrogation of detainees were finalized.5 The memoranda define
5For links to this memorandum and others, see New York Times’ “Guide to the Memos on torture”, found
at: https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html? Last accessed:
21 April 2018
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torture in sufficiently narrow terms so as to make a wide range of previously unauthorized
interrogation techniques available to American military forces and intelligence agents. The
memos were classified Top Secret at the time, so unbeknown to the American public, as
early as August of 2002 it was the policy of the U.S. Government that certain techniques that
had traditionally constituted torture were authorized for use on detainees. In reference to a
2014 Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the CIA’s use of so called “enhanced inter-
rogation techniques,” President Obama himself admitted “we tortured some folks” (Miller
2014).
In April 2004, evidence of abuse in Abu Ghraib prison was made public, largely by the
efforts of a very junior enlisted Army soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby. The public outcry
and subsequent legal proceedings against seven low-level (a Staff Sergeant was the most
senior) perpetrators leave little doubt that Darby correctly identified the actions of those
around him as immoral and illegal (Hersh 2004; Snow 2009). In contemplating the obe-
dience level of the officer corps, one must wonder how it came to be that the burden of
revealing the abuse came to land upon such a low-ranking soldier. At the time, the admin-
istration did attempt to paint the scandal as an isolated instance, rather than the direct result
of flawed policy approved at the highest levels. However, that position becomes more diffi-
cult to maintain once the memos became known to the public two months later, revealing a
much wider authority to use (Priest and Smith 2004).
One must wait until September of 2005 before we observe an officer taking a public
stand against detainee abuse in general and torture in particular. At that time, Captain Ian
Fishback, an Army officer, penned a letter to Senator JohnMcCain urging him to investigate
the administration’s policies regarding detainee treatment and to provide clearer guidelines
for the military personnel involved in the process (Fishback 2005). Even after Fishback’s
letter, policy was not substantially changed until President Obama took office in 2009, nor
did many other officers speak out. Thus, an untold number of uniformed military members
participated directly, and an even larger number were collectively rendered blameworthy by
the policy, at least since credible news broke in 2004.
5.1.2 Operation Odyssey Dawn: a Clear Case of Servility
The United States, with coalition partners, initiated combat operations in Libya in March
2011 in an effort to enforce United Nations resolutions to support Libyan rebels and pro-
tect civilians. For argument’s sake, we stipulate that the initiation of force was consistent
with the President’s Article II powers under the U.S. Constitution. However, the War Pow-
ers Act (WPA) of 1972 requires that the President obtain authorization from Congress for
committing forces to combat within sixty days. Absent congressional consent, the President
has only thirty days to withdraw forces after that. Thus, in June of 2011, ninety days after
the initiation of hostilities and without any specific authorization from congress supporting
the use of force, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the Office of Legal
Counsel, reportedly with the Attorney General’s concurrence, all wrote legal memoranda
stating their opinion that the administration’s actions in Libya violated the WPA (Savage
2011). Yet, there was no interruption in military operations and no evidence that any of the
senior leadership of that operation, uniformed or otherwise, appeared to show any concern.
The top lawyer in the United States Government and the top lawyer in the Department
of Defense both took a public stand that their own administration was in violation of the
law and the apparent response among the members of the officer corps was silence. The
government has instituted a number of controversial policies in its prosecution of the war
on terror, but few issues during this time have been as straightforward as this one. That the
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flag and general officers ignored this legal issue constitutes some of our most convincing
evidence that the officer corps would benefit from more loyal dissent in these matters.
5.1.3 Brief Summary
We take the fact that so few officers spoke out against the above mentioned policies as sug-
gestive that the norm against public dissent of any sort is strong. Gently relaxing such a
powerful norm is unlikely to result in a dramatic increase in instances of dissent, mistaken
or otherwise, due to the necessity of guarding ones reputation against making a mistake.
However, it would allow room for military officers who are concerned enough to exam-
ine questionable policies, think deeply about their effects, and then attempt to inform the
public of what they’ve learned. Such officers are likely to positively influence the state of
the debate and positively influence policy-makers more specifically, along the lines that
Brooks (2009) suggests. For example, if even one high-ranking officer involved with Oper-
ation Dawn had spoken out, it might have been enough to encourage the administration to
seek congressional approval. The evidence is at least suggestive that the benefits of officers
offering public dissent would outweigh any costs of errors of commission.
5.2 Officers Would Become too Political
Some may argue if officers constantly weigh in on political matters, it will turn the officer
corps into an overly politicized organization and undermine civilian control of the military.
Huntington was highly sensitive to the notion that only an extremely obedient officer corps
could effectively serve the state and thereby ultimately succeed in its functional imperative
(Huntington 1957, pg. 83). In Huntington’s world, officers leave politics to the politicians
while politicians leave the management of violence to military officers. Huntington had a
profound impact on generations of career military officers. Consider, for example, there was
once a pervasive norm among officers to not vote in elections.6
It essential to differentiate between political and partisan behavior. First, a number of
scholars note the extreme difficulty of differentiating political concerns from military con-
cerns at the highest levels of the strategic decision making (Burk 2002; Brooks 2009). Was
General Shinseki’s testimony before congress in 2003 that the proposed invasion force was
insufficient a purely military matter or was it also a political matter? Officers should make
it their business to be informed on political matters, because it is ultimately the task of
politicians to set the strategic objectives for military action. Officers should understand the
political environment, both for domestic matters and matters of foreign policy. Being well
informed will simply make them better at their jobs.
In contrast, military members should absolutely avoid partisan behavior. They should
avoid adherence to and affiliation with political parties and the outcomes of particular elec-
tions. Keeping out of the partisan fray will maintain the officer’s credibility. Again, General
Shinseki’s testimony was not typically seen as having a partisan motive because he did
not show himself to be a partisan officer. Few doubt he would have had the same military
opinion of the Iraq invasion if it had been a democratic administration in the white house.
As long as officers who engage in public dissent do not do so for partisan reasons, the
6Army Chief of Staff during WWII, General George Marshall, is credited by many as the paragon of the non-
partisan officer of this era and the fact that he did not vote was widely known. See Kohn Kohn (2009) and
Corbett and Davidson Corbett and Davidson (2009) for discussions of the norm among officers to abstain
from voting in elections.
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credibility of the officer corps can be maintained while simultaneously offering effective
critique of policy.
5.3 This is not an Officer’s Area of Expertise
Another objection is that we have downplayed the complexity of many of these policy issues
and that most officers lack the expertise required to give thoughtful analysis to these con-
troversial matters. The average officer simply is not equipped to worry about these matters
and to expect them to identify when and how to act under such circumstances expects too
much of them. We agree. Not many officers are also scholars of Constitutional Law, but
perhaps more should be, or at least they should become more familiar with the Constitution
and the nature of the war-making and other relevant powers it imbues in the branches of
government.
Few agents of the government take their oath to support and defend the Constitution
more seriously than do professional military officers. Twenty-five years ago, there were no
experts in cyber-warfare in uniform, but the importance of that field has grown, and as such,
the number of expert military officers in that field has grown. The lesson here is that officer
expertise flows to whatever is valuable to the chain of command and, to a slightly lesser
extent, the individual officer. If the objection is that officers are insufficiently educated
and therefore should not worry about policy matters and their moral implications, then we
should find both formal and informal ways for officers to get that education.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we argue that career military officers have the right to offer public dissent in
response to immoral, unconstitutional, or illegal government policy when certain conditions
are met, and ought to be encouraged to exercise that right when appropriate. This right
exists even if the officer in question is not directly involved in the execution of the offending
policy. We extend the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics, the prevailing ethical
construct among the officer corps in the United States, as a guide to justify this position.
While we conclude that resignation would satisfy ethical requirements, public dissent has
the additional benefit of providing possibly crucial feedback to the institution and we offer
evidence to suggest that the officer corps is currently too reluctant to offer criticism of illegal
or immoral policy to the detriment of national ideals.
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